Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 2

Article 1

8-10-2016

After O2 Micro: The Court's Evolving Duty to Map
Words to Things
Peter E. Gratzinger

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Peter E. Gratzinger, After O2 Micro: The Court's Evolving Duty to Map Words to Things, 32 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 141 (2016).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol32/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

AFTER O2 MICRO: THE COURT’S EVOLVING
DUTY TO MAP WORDS TO THINGS
Peter E. Gratzinger†
One of the central conundrums of patent law is how to map
words to things. Since Markman, and the Federal Circuit’s decision
in O2 Micro, it has been the duty of the court to resolve disputes over
the scope of patent claims. Yet trial courts take very different
approaches to discharging this duty. For example, some will provide
constructions for dozens of claim terms, while others will determine
that all but a few should be given their “plain meaning” by the jury.
This Article discusses developments in Federal Circuit authority
regarding the substantive and procedural duty of district courts to
resolve disputes over claim scope. It argues that courts should read
O2 Micro as a mandate to take an active role in ensuring that trial
outcomes are grounded in protecting what the inventor actually
invented.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]hat’s for y’all to fight over and for the jury to resolve.” So
ruled an Eastern District of Texas Magistrate when a dispute arose
over the meaning of “an” and “said” in a patent claim.1 According to
the Federal Circuit, the ruling was reversible error.2 The Federal
Circuit held in an unpublished disposition that the trial court had a
duty to resolve the claim construction dispute rather than allowing the
lawyers to each argue their own theory of the meaning of the claim to
the jury.3 The Federal Circuit’s decision cited to the Federal Circuit’s
seminal case in O2 Micro, which held that “[w]hen the parties raise
an actual dispute regarding the proper scope of [asserted] claims, the
court, not the jury, must resolve that dispute.”4
Yet despite this seemingly simple premise, there is wide
variation in how district courts interpret and implement the duty to
resolve claim construction disputes. A striking example of this
variation can be seen in the way that two different district court
judges in the District of Nevada handled two parallel patent
infringement actions filed by the same patent owner, Unwired Planet
LLC.
In the first case against Google Inc., the district court construed
the claims of five patents.5 Unwired Planet argued that many terms

1. Creative Internet Advert. Corp. v. Yahoo!, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (E.D. Tex.
2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
5. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00504-MMD, 2014 WL 7012497,
at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2014). The author is counsel of record for Google, Inc. in this matter,
from which an appeal is pending.
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had a “plain meaning” and required no construction.6 The district
court disagreed, holding that O2 Micro required it to construe claims
when the scope is in dispute.7 The district court provided
constructions for all twenty-two terms submitted by Google for
construction.8 Ultimately, Unwired Planet stipulated that it could not
prove infringement of any of the five patents at issue under the district
court’s constructions—including the constructions of the terms for
which it had advocated a “plain meaning” construction.9
Unwired Planet’s lawsuit against Square before a different judge
in the same district took a very different trajectory. Square sought
construction for sixteen terms from three patents, roughly in
proportion to Google’s request to construe twenty-two terms across
five patents.10 The district judge in the Square case, however, cited
O2 Micro for the proposition that “a district court is not obligated to
construe terms with ordinary meanings, lest trial courts be inundated
with requests to parse the meaning of every word in the asserted
claims.”11 The district judge agreed with Unwired Planet that only
two of sixteen terms submitted by Square needed construction, and
that the remainder are “best given their ordinary meanings.”12 Unlike
the Google case, this result was apparently not dispositive. The parties
continued to litigate until the proceedings were ultimately stayed in
favor of Covered Business Method review by the Patent Trial and
Appeals Board.13
It is apparent, therefore, that while the key principle of O2 Micro
may be clear, district courts vary widely in their views of how to put
it into effect. Two key questions frequently arise in district court
litigation regarding the duty to construe claim terms: (1) when (if
ever) can a construction of “plain meaning” satisfy the trial court’s
duty under O2 Micro, and (2) when (if ever) is it simply too late to
ask the trial court to step in?

6. Id. at *16, *22, *30.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *1 & n.3.
9. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00504-MMD, Dkt. No. 463 (D.
Nev. Mar. 26, 2015).
10. See Unwired Planet, LLC v. Square, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00579-RCJ, 2014 WL
4966033 at *7 (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2014)).
11. Id. at *2 (citing O2 Micro, supra note 4.).
12. Id. at *7.
13. Unwired Planet, LLC v. Square, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00579-RCJ, Dkt. No. 109 (D.
Nev. Feb. 10. 2015).
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Three recent Federal Circuit cases provide some guidance on
these issues. In the first case, Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver
Spring Networks, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the trial court
failed to comply with O2 Micro by providing the jury with a “plain
meaning” construction, and held that under the correct construction,
no reasonable jury could have found infringement.14 Circuit Judge
Bryson dissented, arguing that the trial judge correctly resolved the
dispute between the parties by rejecting the defendants’ narrow
proposed construction in favor of “plain meaning.”15
In the second case, Nuance Communications, Inc. v. ABBYY USA
Software House, Inc., the Federal Circuit appeared to suggest that it
was not error for the trial court to leave the scope of the claim to a
jury, where the party seeking a clarification of claim scope had earlier
asked for and obtained a “plain meaning” construction.16
In the third case, GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that even two weeks into trial, it was not too late for the patent
owner to ask the trial court to further construe a claim term, but that
the trial court did not violate O2 Micro when it refused to do so,
because the original construction gave adequate guidance to the
jury.17
This Article takes a closer look at the duty of courts to resolve
disputes over patent scope, in theory and in practice. The first part
frames the judge’s duty to resolve disputes over claim scope within
the broader academic literature about patent law’s central conundrum
of mapping words to things. The second part provides background on
the two touchstone cases regarding the duty to construe: the Supreme
Court’s decision in Markman and the Federal Circuit’s decision in O2
Micro. The third part addresses Federal Circuit authority regarding
the adequacy of “plain meaning” constructions to resolve the parties’
disputes, up through the recent Eon Corp. decision. The fourth part
addresses Federal Circuit authority regarding procedural limits on the
trial court’s duty, up through the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in
GPNE.

14. Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d. 1314, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
15. Id. at 1329 (Bryson, J. dissenting).
16. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368,
1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
17. GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d. 1365, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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I. THE DIFFICULTY OF MAPPING WORDS TO THINGS
The practice of patent law is often a prolonged wrangle over the
meaning of seemingly simple words and phrases. The disputes center
on the patent claim, a formal legal writing which is supposed to put
the public on notice of the “metes and bounds” of the claimed
invention.18 The pivotal role played by a formal legal writing makes
patent litigation quite unlike other types of intellectual property
litigation.
In a copyright infringement trial, for example, a jury directly
compares one recording to another, or a book to a screenplay. The
jury is instructed to compare the “original expression” in one work to
determine if it is “substantially similar” to the other.19 There is no
instrument, written by a lawyer, accompanying each copyright
registration to explain the outer boundaries of the creative expression
embodied in the work. Thus, the jury must exercise its own judgment
and reach its own conclusions about how much similarity is too
much.20
In a trade secret misappropriation trial, the jury will be presented
with the defendant’s conduct—for example, the customer list copied
from the server two days before resignation or the phone calls to
customers the following week—and be asked to make a judgment
about whether the defendant had misused something secret and
valuable in violation of a duty. There may be efforts to crystallize the
alleged trade secrets prior to trial, for example through contention
discovery, or in California, through disclosures under section
2019.210 of the Code of Civil Procedure Section.21 Ultimately,
however, the jury will not be comparing the defendant’s product to a
preexisting legal instrument that defines the metes and bounds of the
trade secret. Instead, the jury will be making judgments—about duty,
breach, secrecy, economic value—that are often difficult to extricate
from one another.

18. See, e.g., In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 536 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“The claims of a validly-issued patent serve an important notice function, alerting the public of
the metes and bounds of an inventor’s discovery.”).
19. See, e.g., Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072, 1077
(9th Cir. 2006).
20. Id. at 1077 (“the intrinsic test [for substantial similarity], which examines an ordinary
person's subjective impressions of the similarities between two works, is exclusively the
province of the jury.”).
21. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 2019.210.
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The goal of a patent trial is to determine whether the defendant is
using the plaintiff’s original invention. In this respect, it is not very
different from the goal of a copyright infringement trial, which is to
determine whether the defendant is using the plaintiff’s original
expression. But the jury in a patent trial is not asked to compare the
plaintiff’s novel gizmo with prior art that lacks the inventive feature
and with the defendant’s knock-off that allegedly includes it. Instead,
the jury is asked to perform a mechanical comparison of the
defendant’s product with a highly stylized paragraph of text written
by a lawyer or patent agent, like the following paragraph that was the
claim at issue in O2 Micro:
A DC/AC converter circuit for controllably delivering power to a
load, comprising an input voltage source; a first plurality of
overlapping switches and a second plurality of overlapping
switches being selectively coupled to said voltage source, said first
plurality of switches defining a first conduction path, said second
plurality of switches defining a second conduction path; a pulse
generator generating a first pulse signal; a transformer having a
primary side and a secondary side, said primary side selectively
coupled to said voltage source in an alternating fashion through
said first conduction path and, alternately, through said second
conduction path; a load coupled to said secondary side of said
transformer; and a feedback control loop circuit receiving a
feedback signal indicative of power being supplied to said load,
and adapted to generate a second signal pulse signal for controlling
the conduction state of said second plurality of switches only if
said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold; and drive
circuitry receiving said pulse signal and controlling a conduction
state of said first and second plurality of switches based on said
first and second pulse signals, wherein, said drive circuitry
alternating the conduction state of said first and second plurality of
switches, controlling the overlap time of the switches in the first
plurality of switches, and controlling the overlap time of the
switches in the second plurality of switches, to couple said voltage
22
source to said primary side.

A patent claim like the one above simply describes a thing, or
sometimes, a series of steps. It typically contains no clues about
which elements or steps are new and which are conventional. It
includes no explanation of how the item described is an improvement
on its predecessors. It is about as lifeless a piece of prose as can be
written. And for the jury that must determine infringement, the task is
22.

U.S. Patent No. 6,259,615 col. 10 l. 55 (filed Nov. 9, 1999).
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supposed to be blinkered: Does the accused product include each and
every of the elements of the claim, or did it not?23 Is the accused
converter circuit “adapted to generate a second signal pulse signal for
controlling the conduction state of said second plurality of switches
only if said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold,”24 or
is it not?
The jury need not know anything about what the patentee
invented to determine if the patent claim is infringed. The patent
specification, of course, typically includes discussion of what the
inventor contributed to the art. But, as discussed further below,
interpreting claim scope in light of the specification is the job of the
judge, not the jury. 25
Disputes over validity, and particularly obviousness, can
sometimes breathe more life into the question of what the inventor
actually contributed to the art. The Supreme Court has warned against
an overly rigid approach to obviousness, holding that “rules that deny
factfinders recourse to common sense” are “neither necessary under
our case law nor consistent with it.”26 Nonetheless, a central
component of proving anticipation or obviousness is an exercise in
box-checking a list of limitations in a patent claim as compared to one
or more prior art references, an exercise not so different from the
infringement analysis.27
Some commentators see this mode of resolving patent
infringement disputes as fundamentally flawed. Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley have argued that the uncertainty of patent scope prior to claim
construction (and thereafter, given the high rates of reversal) show
that the current conceptual model “isn’t working” and that “it may
simply be impossible to cleanly map words to things.”28 The authors
suggest abandoning the idea of “peripheral claiming,” where the

23. See, e.g., Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“[O]nce the claims are construed, infringement is assessed by comparing the accused
device to the claims, and the accused device infringes if it incorporates every limitation of a
claim, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
24. Id.
25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
26. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
27. See e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(anticipation requires showing that “a single prior art reference discloses each and every
limitation of the claimed invention,” and obviousness requires, inter alia, a comparison of
“differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.”).
28. Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, at 1745 (2009).
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patent claim defines the outer boundaries of the inventor’s legal
rights, and moving toward a system of “central claiming,” in which
“the patentee discloses the central features of the invention—what
distinguishes it from the prior art—and the courts determine how
much protection the patent is entitled to by looking at the prior art that
cabins the invention, how important the patentee’s invention was, []
and how different the accused device is.”29 The patent infringement
analysis, in Burk and Lemley’s view, should be a more holistic and
judgment-driven exercise, like copyright analysis.30
Burk and Lemley see O2 Micro as a significant obstacle to
achieving this new norm: “The legal rule that most complicates the
process,” they write, is the Federal Circuit’s decision in O2 Micro
“that every dispute over patent scope must be resolved as a matter of
claim construction. . .”. 31After O2 Micro, courts have no power to
limit the scope of claim construction by passing the dispute to the
jury, no matter how unambiguous the language of the claim might
seem.”32 The more that claim construction is a formalistic process in
the hands of the judge, Burk and Lemley argue, the further away the
process gets from types of judgment a jury must exercise in a
copyright trial.33
“Central claiming,” however, would require a radical rethinking
of the modern patent system in the United States. Short of such a
revolutionary change, perhaps it is possible to see O2 Micro as an
opportunity rather than an obstacle to outcomes that fairly and
predictably protect inventions. The judge, after all, is supposed to
interpret claims “with a full understanding of what the inventors
actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.”34 Thus,
even if the jury must be blinkered in making an infringement
determination, the judge need not be blinkered in interpreting the
scope of the claim.
For example, in Nuance Communications, the plaintiff brought a
dispute over claim scope to the attention of the court prior to trial.35
The court was in a position to resolve the dispute over how to map

29. Id. at 1746.
30. Id. at 1774-76.
31. Id. at 1754.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Renishaw
PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added).
35. Nuance Commc’ns, supra note 16, at 1372.
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words to things with reference to the specification and “a full
understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to
envelop with the claim.”36 The jury, in the end, was guided only by a
tautological dictionary definition.37 The Nuance decision refrained
from second-guessing the procedures of the trial court that, on their
face, appeared to give ample opportunities to the plaintiff to make its
case. Still, it does bear asking, at what cost?
Indeed, one might expect that a large proportion of infringement
disputes could be resolved by the court without assistance from the
jury. Certainly, some infringement disputes turn on disputes of fact,
such as a case where infringement turns on a doctrine of equivalents
analysis,38 or on the accused infringer’s willful blindness in an
indirect infringement case.39 But in many cases, the relevant facts
about how the accused product works or how it is constructed are
undisputed by the close of discovery.
O2 Micro appears to give Courts the authority to resolve many
disputes over how words should be mapped to things, and by
extension, many infringement disputes. Yet, as this Article shows,
district courts can sometimes be reluctant to pick up those tools.
II. THE TOUCHSTONES OF THE COURT’S DUTY TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
OVER CLAIM SCOPE: MARKMAN AND O2 MICRO
A. Markman v. Westview Instruments
In Markman, the Supreme Court held that “the construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court.”40 The Supreme Court began its analysis
with the familiar rule that the right of trial by jury preserved by the
Seventh Amendment is “the right which existed under the English
common law when the Amendment was adopted.”41 The Court found
that “evidence of common-law practice at the time of the framing
does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment’s jury

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1373.
38. Brilliant Instruments, Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(expert’s “detailed application of the function-way-result test to the claim element and the
allegedly equivalent feature of the accused product is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact for the jury to resolve.”).
39. Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011).
40. Markman, supra note 25.
41. Id. at 376 (quoting Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935)).
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guarantee to the construction of the claim document.”42 Thus, the
Court turned to “existing precedent,” “the relative interpretive skills
of judges and juries,” and “statutory policies” to determine how to
allocate claim construction between judge and jury.43
Finding “no clear answers” in “history and precedent,” the Court
moved on to “functional considerations.”44 According to the Court,
“the construction of written instruments is one of those things that
judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by
training in exegesis.”45 Patent construction, the Court continued, “is a
special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and
practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to
give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is,
therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a duty, than a
jury can be expected to be.”46 Finally, as to policy, the Court held that
“uniformity in the treatment of a given patent” is an independent
reason to “allocate all issues of construction to the Court.”47
In light of these holdings, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Federal Circuit, which had affirmed the trial court’s
directed verdict based on the judge’s determination that the accused
product could not infringe the patent when properly construed.48
B. O2 Micro v. Beyond Innovation
In O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit amplified the Supreme Court’s
holding in Markman, making clear that not only is the scope of claims
within the province of the court, but that the court has an affirmative
duty to resolve disputes over claim scope when they arise.
In the O2 Micro case, the defendant appealed a final judgment of
infringement on the basis that it was legal error for the district court to
fail to construe a limitation that the parties referred to as the “only if”
limitation.49 The limitation required a control loop circuit to control
the conduction state of a switch “only if” a feedback signal was above

42. Id. at 384.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 388.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 388-89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849)
(No. 10,740)).
47. Id. at 371, 390.
48. Id. at 391.
49. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1354.
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a predetermined threshold.50 The parties disputed whether a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood this limitation to apply
at all times without exception, or only during the “steady state
operation” of the switch.51 The defendant argued, for example, that
the “only if” limitation was not satisfied during the “start-up phase”
of the switch, and therefore, that the claim was not infringed.52
During a claim construction hearing prior to trial, the district
court acknowledged the dispute over the whether there can be any
“exception” to the “only if” limitation, but declined to resolve it.53
Instead, the district court held that “‘[o]nly if’ has a well-understood
definition, capable of application by both the jury and this court in
considering the evidence submitted in support of an infringement or
invalidity case.”54 At trial, both parties presented arguments regarding
whether or the “only if” limitation allows for exceptions.55 The jury
found the claim infringed.56
The Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of infringement.57 It
held that Markman required the district court to resolve the dispute
over the scope of the “only if” limitation.58 The Federal Circuit
explained the district court “failed to resolve the parties’ dispute
because the parties disputed not the meaning of the words themselves,
but the scope that should be encompassed by this claim language.”59
The Federal Circuit continued, “[a] determination that a claim term
‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may
be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or
when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the
parties’ dispute.”60
Following this holding, the Federal Circuit proceeded to assure
district courts that they “are not (and should not be) required to
construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims.”61 The

50. Id. at 1360.
51. Id. at 1361.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2:04–CV–32,
2005 WL 6343460, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005)).
55. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1358.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1361, 1366.
58. Id. (citing Markman, supra note 25).
59. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1361.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1362.
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Federal Circuit quoted its prior statement in U.S. Surgical Corp. that
claim construction “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”62
The U.S. Surgical case had been tried and appealed prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Markman and had come back before the
Federal Circuit on remand for further consideration in light of
Markman.63 On remand, the Federal Circuit found that there was no
error in the trial court’s failure to provide claim constructions because
none of the proffered constructions “was directed to, or has been
shown reasonably to affect, the determination of obviousness” that
had been dispositive in that case.64 While acknowledging this
outcome in U.S. Surgical, the Federal Circuit nonetheless concluded
that “[w]hen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the
scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.”65
III. WHEN IS A “PLAIN MEANING” CONSTRUCTION ADEQUATE?
One key question raised by O2 Micro is when, if ever, it is
appropriate for trial courts to resolve the parties’ disputes by holding
that a claim term has its “plain meaning.”66
The Unwired Planet cases are illustrative of the fact that, on the
whole, accused infringers tend to seek detailed constructions, while
patentees tend to ask for “plain meaning.”67 There are numerous
strategic reasons that parties typically behave in this manner. For
example, even some months into discovery, the patentee may have a
less detailed understanding of a complex accused product than the
accused infringer. A patentee may perceive a “plain meaning”
construction as affording more flexibility down the road to read the
patent claim on the accused product as details about that product
emerge. More generally, a patentee may reason that the more
flexibility it maintains regarding claim scope, the more likely it is to
survive summary judgment and get in front of a jury. It is therefore
common for patentees to offer “plain meaning” as a broader and/or
more flexible alternative to the defendant’s proposed construction.
62. Id. (quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
63. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
64. Id.
65. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1362.
66. Compare, e.g., Unwired Planet, supra note 5, at *1 & n.3 (construing twenty-two
claim terms despite plaintiff’s request for numerous “plain meaning” constructions) with
Unwired Planet, supra note 10, at *2 (holding that fourteen of sixteen claim terms have their
“plain meaning”).
67. See Unwired Planet, supra note 5, at *1 & n.3; Unwired Planet, supra note 10, at *2.
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For the accused infringer, the reverse is true. The accused
infringer will have a detailed knowledge of its products and will be
motivated to make clear, as early in the case as possible, that the
patent does not read on its product. The lower standard of proof for
non-infringement (preponderance of the evidence)68 versus invalidity
(clear and convincing evidence)69 may tip the strategic scale for an
accused infringer to seek a narrow construction that excludes the
accused product, rather than a broad construction that encompasses
the prior art. With the increasing popularity of inter partes review, an
accused infringer may even employ a dual strategy of narrow
constructions in the district court litigation and broad constructions
before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board under the “broadest
reasonable interpretation” standard.70
Because of these competing strategic interests, it is not
uncommon for a district court to be faced with a long wish list of
detailed constructions from an accused infringer, while the patentee
urges that fewer terms be construed or that many of the terms be
given their “plain meaning.” On occasion, the reverse can also be
true, with an accused infringer seeking a “plain meaning”
construction and a patentee seeking detailed definition that, for
example, the patentee hopes will clearly distinguish the claimed
invention from a key prior art reference, or will clarify that the
accused product is in fact within the scope of the claim.
O2 Micro provides that the “determination [of] a claim term[‘s]
‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when the term has
more than one ordinary meaning or when reliance on the term’s
ordinary meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”71 But this
begs the question: When does reliance on the term’s ordinary
meaning resolve the parties’ dispute?
A. Rejection of a Narrow Construction in Favor of “Plain
Meaning” May Resolve the Parties’ Dispute, Particularly When
It Is Binary
Multiple Federal Circuit decisions, discussed below, have held
that by explicitly rejecting a narrow construction in favor of “plain

68. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
69. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
70. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146, 195 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2016).
71. O2 Micro, supra note 4, at 1361.
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meaning,” the district court did, in fact, resolve the dispute over claim
scope, as O2 Micro requires.
In ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., for
example, ActiveVideo argued that the district court erred under O2
Micro by rejecting its claim construction and adopting Verizon’s
proposed “plain meaning” construction.72 The Federal Circuit
disagreed and affirmed the district court’s denial of ActiveVideo’s
JMOL of non-infringement.73
The patent at issue in ActiveVideo disclosed a two-dimensional
method of channel surfing, with “anchor channels” on a vertical axis
(e.g., ABC) and channels related to the anchor channels (e.g., ABC
News, ABC Sports) on a horizontal axis.74 Superimposed on the
display of an anchor channel were two indications: one identifying the
anchor channel as an anchor channel and another indicating the
existence of associated multiplex channels.75 In particular, the method
claim required, in relevant part, “superimposing the first indication
over the display of the first anchor channel” and “including with the
first indication a second indication” related to the associated
channels.76
ActiveVideo argued that under a correct construction of the
claim, “the first and second indications must be overlaid on the
displayed anchor channel and that they must be distinct from the
content of the anchor channel.”77 ActiveVideo argued that its system
could not infringe under this construction because the indications
(channel labels) in its system are broadcast as part of the “underlying
content” of the anchor channel and are thus not “superimposed.”78 In
other words, it appears that the parties disputed what it meant to
“superimpose” an indication: Did it require two distinct pieces of
graphical content with one overlaid on the other, or could the
limitation be satisfied by a single piece of graphical content with
multiple visual elements?
Verizon argued that “the district court resolved the dispute
between the parties and satisfied O2 Micro by declining to adopt

72. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1324-1325.
75. Id. at 1325.
76. Id. at 1325.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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ActiveVideo’s construction and giving the terms their plain and
ordinary meaning.”79 The Federal Circuit agreed that rejecting the
accused infringer’s proposed restrictive construction was sufficient to
resolve the dispute.80 The Federal Circuit further held that “[i]t was up
to the jury to determine from the evidence presented at trial whether
the ActiveVideo system satisfied the plain and ordinary meaning of
the ‘superimposing’ limitations.”81
The Federal Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Summit 6,
LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.82 There, the dispute centered on the words
“being provided to” in the following claim limitation: “[] preprocessing said digital content at said client device in accordance with
one or more pre-processing parameters, said one or more preprocessing parameters being provided to said client device from a
device separate from said client device. . .” (emphasis added).83
Samsung, the accused infringer, argued in the trial court that this
limitation required ongoing activity, namely, the provision of the preprocessing parameters during the operation of the method.84 The
patentee argued that the phrase merely described a characteristic of
the pre-processing parameters, i.e., that they originated on a separate
device.85 The patentee argued that the phrase imposed no temporal
limitation on when the pre-processing parameters had to be
provided.86 The patentee requested that the words be construed as
having their “plain meaning,” and the trial court agreed.87
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the patentee that
“being provided to” did not require ongoing activity, holding that the
phrase is “not a step in the claimed method.”88 The Federal Circuit
also rejected Samsung’s argument that with its “plain meaning”
construction, the trial court had failed to resolve the dispute over the
scope of the claim term, as required by O2 Micro.89 The Federal
Circuit explained that “[a]t the claim construction stage, the district

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
altered).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,765,482 at col.14 ll.1-5 (filed Oct. 8, 2004)) (italics
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court rejected Samsung’s argument. . . to further construe the term
because it was a ‘straightforward term’ that required no
construction.”90 The Federal Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the
plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed claim language is clear,
the district court did not err by declining to construe the claim
term.”91
When the trial court rejects a proposed construction as too
narrow or otherwise incorrect, it undoubtedly goes some way toward
resolving a dispute over claim scope. Whether it has fully resolved the
dispute, however, and ensured that the jury will not misapply the
claim language, would seem to depend on the circumstances.
The Summit 6 case appears to be a good example of a rejection
of a detailed construction in favor of “plain meaning” construction
that truly resolved the dispute between the parties. There was a single,
binary dispute over the scope of “being provided to”: Did it require
ongoing activity, or not? The trial court held that it did not, a result
later confirmed by the Federal Circuit.92 Samsung presumably knew
better than to argue otherwise to the jury (or was ordered not to do
so).93 Thus, there was little danger that the jury would take claim
construction into its own hands and misconstrue the scope of the
claim, despite the trial court’s “plain meaning” construction.
The outcome in the ActiveVideo case is perhaps more
ambiguous. The trial court rejected the accused infringer’s argument
that the “superimposed” limitation requires there must be two distinct
pieces of graphical content that are overlaid onto a third.94 The
patentee argued on appeal, however, that even this narrowed
construction would not have eliminated infringement because it
“places no limitation on how or where the indication is generated, as
opposed to how it is displayed to the viewer.”95 The patentee’s
argument suggests that the dispute was not binary and that there were
at least three possible interpretations of the “superimposed”

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Even when a trial court adopts a “plain meaning” instruction, it can still prevent the
parties from advocating a construction that it previously rejected, thus cabining the scope of the
“plain meaning” that the jury may consider. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (no violation of duty under O2 Micro where trial court
“prevented the jury from reconstruing the term by stopping Defendants’ expert” from arguing a
position the court had previously rejected).
94. ActiveVideo, supra note 72.
95. Id.
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limitation: (a) distinct graphics that are overlaid at the time of display
to the viewer; (b) distinct graphics that are overlaid at any point in
time; or (c) a single piece of graphical content with distinguishable
elements. The trial court rejected the first possibility, but then turned
the problem over to the jury to apply the “plain meaning.”96 It is not
entirely clear that the district court’s resolution left no room for the
jury to make its own determinations of claim scope.
B. In Eon Corp., Rejecting A Narrow Construction for “Plain
Meaning” Failed to Resolve a Non-Binary Dispute
In Eon Corp, the Federal Circuit held that the trial court had
neglected its duties under O2 Micro by rejecting the accused
infringer’s proposed narrow constructions and giving the limitations
“portable” and “mobile” their “plain meaning.”97 The Federal Circuit
further determined that no reasonable jury could have found that the
accused devices were “portable” or “mobile” in the context of the
claimed invention, and reversed the judgment of infringement.98
The patents at issue in Eon Corp. were directed to techniques for
wireless communications between a local subscriber and a base
station to overcome certain problems related to heavy network
traffic.99 The claims required the subscriber units to be “portable” or
“mobile.”100 The specification described “portable battery-operated
milliwatt transmitter subscriber units” that can be “moved throughout
the base station geographical area” and can be “handed off” from cell
to cell.101 The accused subscriber units were “electric watt-hour utility
meters designed to be attached to the exterior walls of buildings.”102
Silver Spring, the accused infringer, sought a construction of
“portable” and “mobile” as “capable of being easily and conveniently
moved” and “designed to operate without a fixed location,” as
opposed to “fixed or stationary products that are only theoretically
capable of being moved.”103 The patentee, Eon, argued that the term
should be given its “ordinary meaning.”104 The trial court agreed,

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1324-26.
Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1318.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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holding that Silver Spring was “asking for nothing the plain and
ordinary meaning of the terms cannot do on their face—distinguish
from ‘stationary’ or ‘fixed.’”105 The trial court held that this
“‘resolved the parties’ claim scope dispute.’”106
The Federal Circuit disagreed.107 It explained that while “a court
need not attempt the impossible task of resolving all questions of
meaning with absolute, univocal finality,” the trial court does have a
duty under O2 Micro “to resolve a dispute about claim scope that has
been raised by the parties.”108 The Federal Circuit continued:
The crucial question was whether, as Silver Spring argued, the
terms should not be construed so broadly such that they covered
“fixed or stationary products that are only theoretically capable of
109
being moved.”
By determining only that the terms should be
given their plain and ordinary meaning, the court left this question
of claim scope unanswered, leaving it for the jury to decide. This
110
was legal error.

The Federal Circuit proceeded to construe the words “portable”
and “mobile” in light of the specification.111 The majority found that
“the specification’s guidance on the claimed ‘portable’ and ‘mobile’
units is that they are low-power, battery operated units that are easily
transported between different locations in a house, office, car, or
throughout a cell territory,” and that “Eon’s position is completely
untethered to the context of the invention in this case.”112 Having
effectively adopted the claim construction that had been proposed by
Silver Spring and rejected by the trial court, the Federal Circuit held
that no reasonable jury could have found the accused utility meters to
be “portable” or “mobile.”113
Judge Bryson’s dissent in Eon Corp. disagreed that the
specifications of the asserted patents supported the “restrictive
definition” adopted by the majority, and argued that under the
“ordinary” meaning of “mobile” and “portable,” there was sufficient

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
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evidence to support the jury’s verdict.114 The dissent pointed out that
the jury heard extensive testimony regarding the portability of the
utility meters, including evidence that the accused meters “are smaller
than a volleyball and can be, and are, easily carried and installed by
hand.”115 The dissent concluded that the “ordinary meaning [of
portable]—something capable of being easily and conveniently
transported—would clearly apply to the accused devices in this
case.”116
Judge Bryson’s dissent further disagreed that the trial court had
shirked its duty under O2 Micro by holding that the disputed terms
had their “plain meaning.”117 Instead, he argued, “the district court’s
instruction that the jury should give those terms their plain and
ordinary meaning resolved the parties’ dispute, because it was clear
that Eon was relying on the plain meaning of the terms and Silver
Spring was relying on a special definition of the terms that it claimed
to be supported by the language of the patents.”118
At a high level, the holding of Eon Corp. may appear
inconsistent with the holding of Summit 6. In both cases, the trial
court rejected a narrow proposed construction as incorrect, and told
the parties to apply the “ordinary meaning” instead.119 Yet in Summit
6, the Federal Circuit held that this was effective in resolving the
parties’ dispute, while in Eon Corp., the Federal Circuit held that it
was not.120
On closer inspection, it may be possible to reconcile the two
decisions. In Summit 6, the claim construction dispute was binary:
either the claim required ongoing activity, or it did not. By rejecting
Samsung’s argument that the claim required ongoing activity, the trial
court effectively removed the issue as a potential non-infringement
argument for Samsung. In Eon Corp., by contrast, the trial court’s
rejection of Silver Spring’s proposal that the claims required a
subscriber unit “designed to operate without a fixed location” did not
resolve the underlying infringement question. The parties continued
to dispute whether the accused utility meters were “portable” or

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1323 (Bryson, J. dissenting).
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id.
Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1317; Summit 6, supra note 82.
Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1318; Summit 6, supra note 82, at 1291.
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“mobile” under the “ordinary meaning” of those words.121 In other
words, the potential scope of “portable” was not binary, but rather,
fell on a continuum. Even if the trial court lopped off the furthest end
of the continuum that would have guaranteed a win for Silver Spring,
there was still ample room left for dispute at trial.
Put another way, one interpretation of Eon Corp is that the duty
under O2 Micro is to fully resolve disputes over how the words of the
claim map to the specific things at issue. There may be underlying
fact disputes about what those things are or how they work. But, once
the jury resolves those underlying fact disputes, the court’s
constructions should ideally compel a single outcome as to the
presence or absence of a limitation in the accused product. When
there is no underlying fact dispute, claim construction should be
dispositive in and of itself. Eon Corp. demonstrates that rejecting a
narrow construction in favor of “plain meaning” may meet these
criteria, but there is no guarantee that it will do so.
If this interpretation of Eon Corp. is correct, it significantly
limits those cases where it is appropriate for a trial court to resolve a
dispute by resorting to “plain meaning.” A claim construction order
like the one in the Square case, for example, where the trial court
assigns a “plain meaning” to most of the disputed terms with little
analysis, would present a significant danger of ultimate reversal under
this reading of Eon Corp.122
Of course, an early but limited claim construction order like the
one in the Square case will not necessarily be the trial court’s last
word on claim scope. The district court in the Square case could have
revisited some of the “plain meaning” constructions at a later time,
when the non-infringement disputes had further crystallized. The next
section examines this procedural dimension of O2 Micro: at what
point can the Court say that it has done enough?
IV. WHEN IS IT TOO LATE TO ASK FOR FURTHER CONSTRUCTION?
There is no fixed rule that requires courts to construe claims at a
particular point in the proceedings. District courts have experimented
with different procedures. For example, it is not uncommon for
district courts to forego a separate Markman hearing and construe

121.
122.

Eon Corp., supra note 14, at 1318.
Unwired Planet, supra note 10, at *2 (citing O2 Micro, supra note 4).
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claims in the course of summary judgment proceedings.123 Districts
with heavy patent dockets, however, tend to have local rules or a
general practice of scheduling separate Markman hearings within a
set number of days of the Initial Case Management Conference.124
O2 Micro requires district courts to resolve disputes over claim
scope.125 At the same time, Federal Circuit authority recognizes that
there must be some limits on the demands that litigants can make of
judicial resources. One limiting factor is that “only those terms need
be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary
to resolve the controversy.”126 Attorneys, however, are quite adept at
generating controversies. This section discusses some of the
procedural limits that the Federal Circuit has recognized on the duty
to resolve disputes over claim scope.
A. Waiting Too Long to Raise a Dispute Can Result in Waiver
Soon after its opinion in O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit made
clear that the duty to resolve disputes over claim scope does not mean
that litigants can raise claim construction issues for the first time in
post-trial motions.127 The Federal Circuit held that “litigants waive
their right to present new claim construction disputes if they are
raised for the first time after trial.”128
More recently, the Federal Circuit held that waiting to seek
clarification of existing constructions until after the close of evidence
may be too late.129 In Akamai v. Limelight, the Federal Circuit held
that there was no violation of O2 Micro where the parties stipulated to
claim construction, and the accused infringer only sought a narrower

123. See, e.g., Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc., 440 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Senior
Judge Louis H. Pollak did not issue a separate Markman order; rather, in a carefully-crafted
summary judgment opinion, he construed two limitations of claim 1 of the patent and found as a
matter of law that neither limitation was present in the accused shoes.”).
124. See, e.g., Patent Local Rules, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA (Sept. 28, 2016), available at www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent.
125. O2 Micro, supra note 4.
126. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See
also, e.g., Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc., 607 F.3d 784, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The
testimony of both sides’ experts at trial indicates that that term was not fundamentally in
dispute, thus, it was proper for the district court not to construe it.”).
127. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 694 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
128. Id. (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Env’t Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)). See also Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1359, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding waiver).
129. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
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construction at the jury instruction stage.130 The Federal Circuit has
also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding
that a party could not add new claim construction theories on the eve
of trial, where the request came a year after a formal claim
construction process and Markman order that was “premised on the
express belief that there were no other claim construction disputes.”131
The fact that the court need not entertain late claim construction
requests from the parties, however, does not mean that it may not do
so. The Federal Circuit has made clear that “district courts may
engage in a rolling claim construction, in which the court revisits and
alters its interpretation of the claim terms as its understanding of the
technology evolves.”132 In one case, the Federal Circuit held that there
was no error in the district court adjusting a Magistrate’s prior
construction of a term in response to a cross-examination at trial that
revealed a dispute over the scope of a claim term.133 Far from finding
any error, the Federal Circuit held that the late clarification was
consistent with the trial court’s duty under O2 Micro to resolve such
disputes.134
B. Nuance Communications Confirms That Failure To
Crystallize A Dispute Early Can Lead To Harsh Outcomes For
The Proponent Of A Narrow Construction
The decision of the Federal Circuit in Nuance Communications,
Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc. arguably went further than
prior precedent in limiting the procedural opportunities for a party to
ask the court to resolve a dispute over claim scope.135
In that case, plaintiff Nuance asserted several patents against
ABBYY related to optical character recognition or “OCR”
technology.136 In an early Markman proceeding, the parties disputed
the construction of “identifying said unknown character.”137 The
accused infringer ABBYY proposed a narrower meaning for
“identifying” that limited it to certain specific OCR techniques, while
130. Id.
131. Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 640-41 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
132. Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
133. Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
134. Id. at 1315-16 (citing O2 Micro, supra note 4).
135. Nuance Commc’ns, supra note 16.
136. Id. at 1369.
137. Id.
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patent holder Nuance argued that “identifying” is “a simple word that
is used every day and there is no indication that the inventors intended
to use this term differently from its commonly understood
meaning.”138 The district court agreed with Nuance and construed
“identifying” to mean “identifying.”139
The parties then took discovery and filed summary judgment
motions. It became apparent in the summary judgment briefing that
the parties disagreed over the “plain meaning” of “identifying.”140
ABBYY’s expert argued that the accused software did not “identify”
an unknown character because it merely produced “a list of guesses
with associated confidence values.”141 In response, Nuance asked for
briefing on the meaning of “identify” so that the dispute could be
resolved before trial.142 The trial court refused.143 Noting that it had
already held two claim construction hearings, the trial court held that
the parties must either agree on a construction, or the court will
supply a dictionary definition, or “just tell the jury to use its ordinary
meaning.”144
Unsurprisingly, the parties failed to reach an agreement. The trial
court then adopted a rather tautological dictionary definition of
“identify” that had been proposed by ABBYY—”to establish the
identity of.”145 The jury found that ABBYY did not infringe the
patents.146
On appeal, Nuance argued that the district court had failed to
exercise its duty to interpret the scope of the claim, as required by O2
Micro. The Federal Circuit disagreed.147 The Federal Circuit’s
reasoning was primarily procedural: “The fact that shortly before trial
Nuance became dissatisfied with its own proposed construction and
sought a new one does not give rise to an O2 Micro violation.”148 The
Federal Circuit cited Akamai v. Limelight, discussed above, in which
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the accused infringer sought to narrow a stipulated construction at the
jury instruction stage.149
There is certainly an appeal to the argument that Nuance, having
previously argued for “plain meaning,” made its bed and must lie in
it. But one could also argue that this is a harsh outcome. Claim
construction hearings are generally held prior to expert reports or
summary judgment motions, and as appears to have been the case in
Nuance, are often held prior even to the close of fact discovery.150 It
can be very difficult, at an early stage, to anticipate every argument
that the opposing party may raise to attempt to show that a particular
feature is either within or outside of the scope of a claim term.
In a similar vein, it is not clear that the analogy to the Akamai
case is a fair one. In Akamai, the accused infringer stipulated to one
claim construction, then sought a narrower claim construction at the
jury instruction phase, after the bulk of the trial was complete.151 The
previously stipulated construction was not “plain meaning” but an
actual definition that, the Federal Circuit held, excluded the narrower
construction sought by the accused infringer at the jury instruction
phase.152 In other words, what the Federal Circuit prohibited in that
case was a change in position after trial. Here, what the plaintiff was
arguably seeking was clarification, prior to trial, of an issue that the
court had yet to address.
To say that the Federal Circuit’s holding was harsh is not
necessarily to say that it was wrong. District courts plainly need to be
able to control their proceedings such that parties do not continue
seeking to revise claim constructions ad infinitum. Parties should be
motivated to crystallize disputes sooner rather than later, and may be
less motivated to do so if they know that they can always revisit claim
construction at a later date. The district court’s seeming impatience in
the Nuance litigation is quite understandable in light of the fact that it
had already held two claim construction hearings. Nonetheless, giving
district courts the green light to leave claim scope to the jury unless
the dispute is crystallized early in the litigation would be a significant
limit on O2 Micro.

149. Id. at 1373.
150. Id. at 1372 (“The parties then took discovery and prepared for trial using the court’s
construction.”).
151. Akamai, supra note 129.
152. Id. (“The lack of further limitations was itself a characteristic of the construction to
which both parties agreed.”).

2016]

AFTER O2 MICRO

165

The Nuance decision is somewhat ambiguous as to whether it
was decided entirely on the procedural ground that Nuance’s request
for clarification came too late. As an alternative to the argument that
the trial court failed to resolve the claim construction dispute, Nuance
argued that the trial court had in fact resolved the claim construction
dispute against it. Nuance argued that the dictionary definition of
“identify” that the trial court adopted conflicted with the intrinsic
evidence, because portions of the specification indicated that
“identifying” includes ambiguous identifications.153 The Federal
Circuit responded that the trial court’s construction was in fact
favorable to Nuance because “[o]ne could ‘establish the identity of’ a
single character or a class of characters.”154 The Federal Circuit
continued:
The operative words in the claims, then, are not “identifying” or
“recognizing,” but instead are the object of those words—what is
being identified or recognized. And that is exactly what the parties
argued over at trial—Nuance contended that ABBYY’s software
satisfies the “identifying an unknown character” limitation when
its recognition process picks out a class of characters, while
ABBYY presented evidence to the contrary. The district court did
nothing to limit Nuance’s ability to present its evidence on this
issue, and its instruction to the jury did not prevent the jury from
fully considering each party’s position. After weighing the
155
evidence, the jury agreed with ABBYY.

There are two ways to read this holding. One interpretation is
that there was no dispute over claim scope in the first place, but rather
a fact dispute, which the jury resolved by “weighing the evidence.”156
This reading is problematic, however. There did not appear to be any
dispute about how the accused FineReader software actually worked.
As the Federal Circuit recited in its background facts, the software
“produce[s] a list of ‘guesses’ and provide[s] a confidence value for
each guess indicating how likely it is that the guess is correct.”157
Rather, the dispute was whether or not the phrase “identifying an
unknown character” should be understood broadly enough to cover
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this functionality.158 The dispute was about mapping words to
things—arguably the function of the court.
A better interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s holding may be
that Nuance not only asked too late, it asked the wrong question. It
asked the court to construe the scope of “identifying,” when in fact, it
should have asked the court to construe the scope of “what is being
identified or recognized.”159 This, too, is a seemingly harsh outcome.
While it is certainly incumbent on the parties in the first instance to
correctly frame the question, the fundamental dispute was not
mysterious: Is identifying a probabilistic set of characters “identifying
an unknown character,” or is it not? That question, it appears, was left
to the jury to decide.
In short, the opinion in Nuance is a nuanced one, but at least one
reading is that even a dispute over claim scope that was raised at the
summary judgment stage may be allowed to go through to the jury, if
the court determines that it should have been raised in an earlier
Markman proceeding.
C. GPNE Corp. Holds That It May Not Be Too Late, Even
During Trial, To Seek Clarification
Even more recently, the Federal Circuit held that two weeks into
trial may not be too late to ask for a clarifying construction.160 The
dispute in GNPE centered on the claim term “node,” which the trial
court construed as a “pager with two-way data communications
capability that transmits wireless data communications on a paging
system that operates independently from a telephone network.”161 The
patent owner GPNE argued that including “pager” in the construction
was too limiting, and that even if it “pager” was correct, that the trial
court erred by failing to further construe the word “pager,” which left
an issue of claim scope to the jury, contrary to O2 Micro.162
Apple, the accused infringer, argued that the inclusion of “pager”
in the construction was correct, and that GPNE had waived its
arguments under O2 Micro because it had failed to request a
construction for “pager” during claim construction proceedings.163
The Federal Circuit held that while the inclusion of “pager” in the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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construction was correct, it was not too late for GPNE to seek a
clarification of “pager” by requesting a further jury instruction two
weeks into trial.164 The Federal Circuit distinguished its previous
holdings that claim construction disputes may not be raised to the trial
court after trial, noting that the case had not yet gone to the jury.165
Further, the Federal Circuit noted that even during the Markman
hearing, GPNE had argued that it was inappropriate to include
“pager” in the claim construction because the parties would end up
arguing over the definition of a pager.166
Though it found no waiver, the Federal Circuit nonetheless held
that the trial court did not err in refusing to further construe “pager”
during the trial.167 The Federal Circuit held that GPNE’s real
complaint was that the trial court allowed Apple to argue to the jury
that it does not infringe because the accused iPhones and iPads are
unlike “1990’s-era legacy pagers.”168 But, according to the Federal
Circuit, the existing construction, which required use of a “paging
system that operates independently from a telephone network,”
adequately clarified that the claimed pagers were unlike those legacy
pagers.169 Construing the dispute as one about improper arguments to
the jury, rather than one about inadequate claim construction, the
Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that Apple’s arguments did not require a new trial.170 The
Federal Circuit noted, for example, that GPNE had ample opportunity
to rebut Apple’s argument in its examination of experts and its own
closing argument, and that it availed itself of those opportunities.171
The most significant holding of GPNE for purposes of this
Article is that it is not necessarily too late, even during trial, to invoke
O2 Micro to seek further construction of a term that has already been
construed. It remains to be seen whether future courts will limit this
holding to situations where the party seeking the further construction
first raised the potential ambiguity during Markman proceedings, or
whether courts will take a more generous view and allow any bona
164. Id.
165. Id. (distinguishing Lazare Kaplan Int'l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d
1359, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 694 (Fed.
Cir. 2008)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id at 1373.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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fide request to clarify disputes over claim scope up through the
submission of the case to the jury.
The GPNE case also serves as a reminder of the more hands-on
role that trial courts could play in disposing of infringement disputes
through early resolution of disputes over claim scope. In the very last
paragraph of the opinion, the Federal Circuit observes that “GPNE
does not appear to articulate an infringement position under the
district court’s construction of ‘node.’”172 In a footnote, the Federal
Circuit further explains that “GPNE has not developed any argument
for why the following evidence fails to support the jury’s noninfringement verdict. All of the accused devices operate on either
GPRS or LTE networks. At trial, GPNE’s expert conceded that both
of these networks become inoperable without GSM resources, J.A.
28417, and that the GSM system is a ‘telephone network.’ J.A. 28413.
Apple’s expert testified to the same. See J.A. 28901–03, 28906.
Linking these statements together yields the conclusion that the
accused devices do not ‘operate independently of a telephone
network.’”173
In other words, the Federal Circuit found on appeal that based on
the undisputed evidence that the accused iPhones and iPads use a
“telephone network,” the trial court’s construction of “node”
precluded this possibility of infringement. This begs the question of
why the case had to go to a jury trial in the first place. While there
may have been factual disputes about “telephone networks” leading
up to trial that are not apparent from the face of the GPNE opinion,
this final footnote is at least suggestive that the trial court, in
resolving the scope of the claim term “node,” might have been able to
resolve the case in its entirety. This, in turn, is a powerful reminder
that the mandate in O2 Micro that judges must resolve disputes over
claim scope can, in effect, be a mandate to judges to resolve patent
disputes before they reach a jury.
CONCLUSION
After several years of experience with O2 Micro, the contours of
the courts’ “duty to construe” are becoming more clear. As the above
discussion demonstrates, however, district courts still have significant
leeway in how to approach their duty to resolve disputes over claim
scope.

172.
173.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1374 n.1.
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District courts are experimenting with ways to push parties to
articulate claim construction disputes in ways that will be dispositive.
The Northern District of California requires litigants to identify the
claim terms for construction that may be claim or case dispositive.174
Judge Robinson in the District of Delaware requires that for “any
contested claim limitation, each party must submit a proposed
construction,” noting that “[r]esorting to ‘plain and ordinary’ meaning
is not sufficient, as it effectively leaves claim construction in the
hands of the experts rather than the court.”175 Chief Judge Stark in the
same district had adopted Judge Robinson’s reasoning, if not her
outright prohibition on “plain meaning” constructions.176
These trial courts appropriately read O2 Micro as a mandate to
take an active role through claim construction in ensuring that trial
outcomes are grounded in protecting what the inventor actually
invented. Cleanly mapping words to things is not easy, but it is the
system we have, and it is the diligent efforts of judges that ultimately
make that system work.

174. Patent Local Rules, supra note 124, at 4-3(c).
175. The Honorable Sue L. Robinson, Patent Case Scheduling Order (Feb. 5, 2015), at 4
& n.6, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/SLR/Forms/Sched-OrderPatent2-05-15.pdf.
176. The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Revised Procedures for Managing Patent Cases
(June
18,
2014)
at
8,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/LPS/PatentProcs/LPSPatentProcedures.pdf.







